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Productivity Slowdown: I 
Economists and policymakers have become 
increasingly concerned in recent years about 
the slowdown in U.S. productivity. Produc-
tivity has always exhibited a strong cyclical 
movement in line with changes in business 
conditions, but analysts today are less con-
cerned with these quarter-to-quarter gyra-
tions than with the secular (noncy<;:lical) 
trend. 
For the private economy, the annual rate of 
increase in labor productivity (output per 
hour) averaged 3.2 percent for the 1948-65 
period, but slowed to 2.3 percent in the 
1965-73 period and then to only 1.2 percent 
in the 1973-78 period. The rate of  increase in 
total factor productivity (output per weighted 
unit of  capital and labor input) exhibited a 
similar slowdown-from an annual rate of 
1.3 percent in the first period to 0.7 percent 
and 0.4 percent in the last two periods, re-
spectively. Since 1978, the figures have been 
much worse, largely reflecting adverse cy-
clical factors in addition to this secular 
weakness. 
Importance of productivity 
Concern over the secular trend of productiv-
ity stems from its role as the key determinant 
ofthe nation's material standard of living. For 
example, at a 3.2-percent annual growth rate 
(the 1948-65 average), real income per hour 
would double in only 22 years, whereas at a 
1.2-percent rate (the 1973-78 average), 58 
years would be required. Moreover, the rate 
of labor-productivity increase is the major 
determinant of  the difference between wage 
and price inflation. With a 3.2-percent rate of 
increase in labor productivity, annual wage 
inflation of 10.0 percent would translate 
roughly into price inflation of 6.8 percent. 
With a 1.2-percent productivity increase, 
however, the same rate of  wage inflation 
would translate into price inflationof8.8 per-
cent. Labor-productivity growth therefore is 
clearly central to the pol  itical issues that arise 
when the gap narrows between wage and 
price inflation. 
What factors underlie the secular deteriora-
tion in productivity growth? A decade ago, 
many studies attributed the. deceleration in 
productivity growth to shifts in employment 
and output among sectors with different 
levels of labor efficiency. In particular, the 
early-postwar shift of workers out of  the low-
productivity farm sector to higher productiv-
ity sectors initially boosted aggregate u.s. 
productivity growth, but this positive effect 
waned as the farm share of  total employment 
declined from 18 percent in 1948 to 5 per-
cent inthe 1970s.  '  . 
The productivity slowdown would not be a 
major pUblic-policy issue if  this were all that 
was involved, because basic structural 
changes in the economy cannot be manipu-
lated easily by government policy. Even if 
they could be, generally itwould not  be in the 
public interest to do so, for such structural 
changes tend to reflectthe public's basic pref-
erences to spend their incomes and seek em-
ployment in ways that increase society's gen-
eral welfare. 
Sectoral shifts 
The importance of sectoral shifts can be test-
ed by subdividing the economy into twelve 
sectors, and then breaking down aggregate 
labor productivity change into "rate" and 
"level" effects. The rate effect is the part of 
aggregate productivity change that is attribut-
able to productivity change within sectors, 
and the level effect is the part attributable to 
shifts in labor (and output) between sectors 
with different productivity levels. Thus, one 
can determine the degree to which the aggre-
gate productivity slowdown has resulted 
from slowdowns within individual sectors, as 
opposed to shifts of labor and output among 
the twelve sectors. 
The first point to note is that the level effect 
(intersectoral shifts) accounted for very little 
of  the aggregate productivity slowdown over 
the 1948-78 period -specifically  for only 0.3 IF\~;cdl~rr©in  ~~~~jfW~ 
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percentage points of  the total 2.0 percentage-
poi nt deceleration between 1948-65 and 
1973-78. Also, while the level effect has con-
tributed to the slowdown in aggregate pro-
ductivity growth over the enti re post WWII 
period, it nevertheless is still positive. This 
reflects the fact that workers have tended to 
shift from low-to-high productivity sectors 
over this period, but at a diminishing rate. 
Thus, the level effect accounted for 0.4 per-
centage points of  the 3.2 percentage-point 
rate of productivity advance in the 1948-65 
period, and for only 0.1  percentage point of 
the 1.2 percentage-point rate of increase over 
the 1973-78 period. 
Large productivity boosts from sectoral shifts, 
while typical of the nation's past economic 
history, are much less evident here:today than 
in developing nations. In some developing 
countries, aggregate productivity change 
may increase as much as 20 percent per year, 
as masses of workers shift from low-produc-
tivity agricultural employment to high-pro-
ductivity industrial jobs. 
Slowdown within sectors 
Productivity slowdowns within most of  the 
twelve major sectors of  the economy (the rate 
effect) in contrast accounted for 1.7 percent-
age points of  the 2.0 percentage-point slow-
down in aggregate labor productivity growth 
between the 1948-65 and 1973-78 periods. 
Labor-productivity growth decelerated signif-
icantly in ten outofthetwelve sectors, and in 
three of those ten, growth rates turned nega-
tive, meaning that their productivity actually 
declined. The same general patterns were 
evident in terms of  total factor productivity-
the productivity of  capital and labor com-
bined. Sectoral analysis thus points to the 
conclusion that the productivity problem is 
symptomatic of most sectors. 
The communications and service sectors 
were the only  ~xceptions to the declining 
trend, and in the latter case the explanation 
may simply be data inaccuracies. Within 
much of  this sector, it is difficult to value 
outputs independently of  inputs and to adjust 
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properly for qual ity change. Thus, the pro-
ductivity data, which show a fairly steady 
annual rate of increase of just under 2 per-
cent, may not give an accurate reflection of 
the true trends in the service sector, and in 
particular, may fail to pick up significant 
changes in trend. 
The communications sector-primarily the 
telephone industry-in contrast was the only 
star productivity performer of  the 1970s. 
Labor-productivity growth accelerated in that 
sector from 5 percent previously to 7 percent 
annually over the 1973-78 period. Total fac-
tor productivity also advanced sharply in 
communications. 
Weakened productivity  .... ;;"" 
Productivity performance elsewhere was 
generally dismal in the 1970s, in terms of 
both labor and total factor productivity. In-
deed, labor productivity actually declined in 
mining, construction, and wholesale trade 
during the 1973-78 period. Mining (oil, gas, 
coal and metals) showed the most dramatic 
deterioration,froma plLJs 4.3-percent annual 
rate in 1948-65 to a minus 4.8-percent rate in 
1973-78. This dramatic decline reflected the 
increasing cost of  marginal production in 
mining-particularly in light of incentives to 
increase marginal output under rising world 
energy prices-and also reflected the ad-
verse effects of safety and environmental leg-
islation on the industry'S measured output. 
(For the most part the benefits of such pro-
grams are not part of measured output. Re-
gardless of  their positive effects, therefore, 
they tend to reduce measured productivity 
growth.) 
Declining levels of productivity in construc-
tion and wholesale trade remain a mystery to 
productivity analysts. The problem in con-
struction may reflect measurement prob-
lems-although measurement problems 
have always plagued this sector, and there-
fore should not have caused the significant 
change in trend which actually occurred in 
that industry. Seven other industry sectors experienced 
positive productivity increases over the 
1973-78 period, but at a much slower pace 
than in the earlier postwar period. This trend 
was so pervasive that it suggests macroeco-
nomic rather than microeconomic factors-
that is, the underlying causes were probably 
common to most of  the sectors. A general 
slowdown in capital investment may be the 
most likely cause, and consequently we shall 
examine that factor in detail in our next 
Weekly Letter. 
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1965-73  1973-78 BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRla 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 







































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
ExceSs Reserves (  + )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
# Includes items not shown separately. 
10/22/80  10/15/80 
66  139 
146  94 
211  45 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
6,684  5.0 
7,928  7.1 
3,189  10.0 
6,918  16.5 
78  0.3 
546  - 31.5 
957  - 12.6 
287  - 1.8 
871  2.0 
1,869  6.0 
162  - 0.5 
8,980  16.0 
8,648  18.2 
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